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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- FIRST AMENDMENT- COMMERCIAL AND
NON-COMMERCIAL SPEECH- CONTENT-BASED REGULATION-
BILLBOARDS-The United States Supreme Court has held that a
municipal ordinance that prohibits outdoor advertising signs but
excepts certain types of commercial and non-commercial
messages from its application violates the first amendment.
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
On March 14, 1972, the city of San Diego, California, enacted
an ordinance prohibiting outdoor advertising display signs1
within its city limits.2 With certain exceptions,3 off-site outdoor
1. Metromedia, Inc., v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 493 (1981). The
California Supreme Court defined "advertising display sign" as "a rigidly
assembled sign, display, or other device permanently affixed to the ground or
permanently attached to a building or other inherently permanent structure
constituting, or used for the display of, a commercial or other advertisement to
the public." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 856 n.2., 610
P.2d 407, 410 n.2., 164 Cal. Rptr. 510, 513 n.2. (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
The court adopted this narrowing definition because the ordinance as written
could have applied to any type of outdoor sign. 453 U.S. at 494 n.2.
2. 453 U.S. at 493 n.1. See San Diego Ordinance No. 10,795 (New Series)
(March 14, 1972) which provides in pertinent part:
b. off-premises outdoor advertising display signs prohibited
only those outdoor advertising display signs, hereinafter referred
to as signs in this Division, which are either signs designating the
name of the owner or occupant of the premises upon which such
signs are placed, or identifying such premises; or signs advertising
goods manufactured or produced or services rendered on the
premises upon which such signs are placed shall be permitted. The
following signs shall be prohibited:
1. Any sign identifying a use, facility, or service which is not
located on the premises.
2. Any sign identifying a product which is not produced, sold,
or manufactured on the premises.
3. Any sign which advertises or otherwise directs attention to
a product, service or activity, event, person, institution or
business which may or may not be identified by a brand
name and which occurs or is generally conducted, sold,
manufactured, produced or offered elsewhere than on the
premises where such sign is located.
3. 453 U.S. at 495 n.3. San Diego Ordinance No. 10,795 § 101.0700(F) (1972)
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advertising signs, those which identified or related to subject
matter not present on the property where the signs were
located, were prohibited, as were most non-commercial signs.'
On-site advertising signs, those which identified the property
upon which they were located, the owner or occupant of the prop-
erty, or a business carried on there, were permitted by the
regulation.5 The stated purpose of the ordinance was to improve
provides:
The following types of signs shall be exempt from the provisions of these
regulations:
1. Any sign erected and maintained pursuant to and in discharge
of any governmental function or required by any law, ordinance
or governmental regulation.
2. Bench signs located at designated public transit bus stops; pro-
vided, however, that such signs shall have any necessary per-
mits required by Sections 62.0501 and 62.0502 of this code.
3. Signs being manufactured, transported and/or stored within the
city limits of the city of San Diego shall be exempt; provided,
however, that such signs are not used in any manner or form,
for the purposes of advertising at the place or places of
manufacture or storage.
4. Commemorative plaques of recognized historical societies and
organizations.
5. Religious symbols, legal holiday decorations and identification
emblems of religious orders or historical societies.
6. Signs located within malls, courts, arcades, porches, patios, and
similar areas where such signs are not visible from any point on
the boundary of the premises.
7. Signs designating the premises for sale, rent or lease; provided,
however, that any such sign shall conform to all regulations of
the particular zone in which it is located.
8. Public service signs limited to the depiction of time,
temperature or news; provided, however, that any such sign
shall conform to all regulations of the particular zone in which it
is located.
9. Signs on vehicles regulated by the city that provide public
transportation including, but not limited to, buses and taxicabs.
10. Signs on licensed commercial vehicles, including trailers; pro-
vided, however, that such vehicles shall not be utilized as parked
or stationary outdoor display signs.
11. Temporary off-premise subdivision directional signs if permitted
by a conditional use permit granted by the zoning ad-
ministrator.
12. Temporary political campaign signs, including their supporting
structures, which are erected or maintained for no longer than
90 days and which are removed within 10 days after election to
which they pertain.
Id.
4. 453 U.S. at 495-96.
5. See supra note 2.
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traffic and pedestrian safety and the appearance of the city by
removing distracting and unsightly signs.' The prohibition was
aimed primarily at commercial billboards although the ordinance
on its face applied to other types of signs as well.7
Metromedia, Incorporated (Metromedia) and Pacific Outdoor
Advertising Company (Pacific) each owned a large number of
outdoor advertising signs which had been lawfully erected in
commercial and industrial areas of the city and had substantial
market value.8 Enforcement of the ordinance would have effec-
tively eliminated their San Diego business.9
Metromedia and Pacific brought suit in a California state court
to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance,"° contending that the
ordinance was an improper exercise of police power; that the city's
threatened elimination of the outdoor advertising business was
prohibited by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment;" and that the ordinance was invalid on its face as abridg-
ing first amendment guarantees of freedom of expression.12
6. 453 U.S. at 493.
7. Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 856 n.2, 610 P.2d
407, 410 n.2, 164 Cal. Rpt. 510, 513 n.2 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). The
California Supreme Court stated that "the history of the ordinance and the
arguments of the parties demonstrate that the purpose of the ordinance is the
prohibition of commercial billboards." Id.
8. 453 U.S. at 496. The plaintiffs had been legally engaged in the outdoor
advertising business in San Diego for over 60 years. Each owned between 500
and 800 outdoor advertising displays ranging in value from $2,500 to $25,000
each as of November, 1974. Each sign then had a remaining useful and income
producing life in excess of 25 years. Brief for Appellants at 5.
9. 453 U.S. at 497. The parties stipulated: "If enforced as written, Or-
dinance 10795 will eliminate the outdoor advertising business in San Diego." Id.
10. 26 Cal. 3d at 857, 610 P.2d at 410, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part: "[N] or shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... "
12. 26 Cal. 3d at 855, 610 P.2d at 409, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 512. U.S. CONST.
amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech . . ." Id. The plaintiffs also argued that the ordinance
denied equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment; that it con-
flicted with and was preempted by the California Outdoor Advertising Act,
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 5200-5486 (West 1974 & Supp. 1982) and the
Federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1976 & Supp. V
1981), that the amatorization period provided for in the ordinance within which
non-conforming signs were to be removed was unreasonably short, and that the
ordinance was invalid because the city had failed to comply with the California
Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21176. (West 1977 &
Supp. 1982). 26 Cal. 3d at 855, 610 P.2d at 409, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
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The trial court invalidated the ordinance as an infringement of
constitutionally protected speech and an unreasonable exercise
of the police power. 13 The California Court of Appeal affirmed
without reaching the first amendment issue." On appeal, the
California Supreme Court reversed,' holding that the ordinance
represented a valid government action because-its objectives of
promoting traffic safety and improving the appearance of the
community were proper goals of local legislation. According to
the court, the prohibition on billboards bore a reasonable
relationship to these objectives.'6 The court further held that the
ordinance did not unconstitutionally abridge freedom of speech
because it served significant government interests, did not sup-
press the content of advertising messages, and because alter-
native methods of communication were available." Metromedia
and Pacific appealed to the United States Supreme Court,'8 and a
strongly divided Court reversed the California judgment. 9
Justice White, author of the plurality opinion, found that the
ordinance infringed constitutionally protected speech and was
unconstitutional on its face. ' The plurality noted that in applying
13. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, Nos. 332881, 333,292 (Cal. Super.
Ct. May 27, 1975), aff'd, 67 Cal. App. 3d 84, 136 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1977), rev'd 23
Cal. 3d 762, 592 P.2d 728, 154 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1979), modified on reh'g, 26 Cal. 3d
848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
14. Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 67 Cal. App. 3d 84, 136 Cal. Rptr.
453 (1977), rev'd, 23 Cal. 3d 762, 592 P.2d 728, 154 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1979), modified
on reh'g, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S.
490 (1981).
15. Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164
Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981).
16. Id. at 865, 610 P.2d at 416, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 519. In making this deter-
mination the California Supreme Court expressly overruled Varney & Green v.
Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909), which had held that promotion of
aesthetic considerations alone did not justify an exercise of police power.
Varney & Green also stood for the proposition that while it was permissible for
government to regulate billboards, it was unconstitutional to absolutely prohibit
them. This reasoning was also rejected by the California Supreme Court which
said, "such sophistry is a mere play on words." 26 Cal. 3d at 865, 610 P.2d at
416, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
17. 26 Cal. 3d at 870-71, 610 P.2d at 419-20, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 522-23. In
reaching this decision, the California Supreme Court gave great weight to the
city's interest in regulating the commercial use of property. Id.
18. The Court noted probable jurisdiction. Metromedia Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 449 U.S. 897 (1980).
19. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
20. Id. at 521 Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell joined in Justice
White's plurality opinion. Justice White observed that the Supreme Court had
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Recent Decisions
first amendment principles to particular methods of expression,
the Court must consider the various natures, values, abuses, and
dangers presented by each unique forum." Justice White also
observed that first amendment values are not absolute.2
The plurality recognized that billboards, like other media,
possess both communicative and non-communicative
characteristics,3 and that although outdoor signs are a well-
established and effective means of expressing a variety of com-
mercial, social, and political messages," they are also large per-
manent structures which present local governments with par-
ticular land use problems.25 Justice White reasoned that govern-
ments have a legitimate interest in controlling the non-communi-
not previously given plenary review to first amendment challenges to legisla-
tion that limited the use of billboards. Id at 498. Earlier cases sustaining the
validity of billboard regulations had not involved first amendment challenges.
See Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); St. Louis Poster Advertising Co.
v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526
(1917) (due process and equal protection challenges to billboard regulations).
More recent billboard regulation cases that had rejected first amendment
arguments had received summary affirmances from the Court. See, e.g., Lotze
v. Washington, 444 U.S. 921 (1979) (summarily rejecting first amendment
challenge to the application of a Washington statute prohibiting the use of on-
site billboards to convey non-commercial messages); Newman Signs Inc. v.
Hjelle, 440 U.S. 901 (1979); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S.
808 (1978); Markham Advertising Co. v. Washington, 393 U.S. 316 (1969) (sum-
marily upholding regulations which prohibited off-site billboards but permitted
on-site commercial outdoor signs). To the extent that these holdings were ap-
plicable, Justice White approved of the California court's reliance upon them.
He explained, however, that such summary actions do not present as strong a
justification for the Supreme Court's declining to reconsider prior decisions as
do decisions rendered after argument and full opinion. He concluded that the
Court could appropriately consider the San Diego ordinance's validity. 453 U.S.
at 500. See Washington v. Confederate Bands and Tribes, 439 U.S. 463, 447 n.20
(1979): "It is not at all unusual for the court to find it appropriate to give full
consideration to a question that has been subject of previous summary action."
Id.
21. 453 U.S. at 501. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1948) (Jackson,
J., concurring); "The moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the sound
track and the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses and
dangers. Each, in my view is a law unto itself..." Id.
22. 453 U.S. at 501.
23. Id. at 502.
24. Id. at 501. For illustrations of the general uses and attributes of
billboards in the United States see Tocker, Standardized Outdoor Advertising:
History, Economics and Self Regulation, in OUTDOOR ADVERTISING: HISTORY
AND REGULATION 26-29 (J. Houke ed. 1969). See generally R. HENDERSON & S.
LANDAU, BILLBOARD ART (1980).
25. 453 U.S. at 502.
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cative aspects of an expressive medium, but are constrained by
the first and fourteenth amendments from regulating its com-
municative attributes. To the extent that a regulation necessarily
affects both facets of an expressive forum, he maintained, courts
must carefully reconcile the first amendment values at stake
with the opposing social interests represented by the govern-
ment action. 6
Justice White observed that the California Supreme Court had
construed the San Diego ordinance as applying to permanent
structures used for the public display of advertising. As con-
strued, only messages identifying the premises upon which the
sign was erected, or the owner or occupant of such premises, or
goods and services available on such property could be expressed
by outdoor signs. In addition, signs bearing certain messages
specifically excepted from the prohibition were also allowed.27
The plurality determined that it would give separate evalua-
tion to the effect of the ordinance on commercial and non-
commercial speech because Ithe Court had consistently differenti-
ated between the constitutional protections afforded to the two
categories.28 Justice White observed that commercial expression'
26. Id. at 502-03. See Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
27. 453 U.S. at 503. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
Metromedia and Pacific contended that the first and fourteenth amendments
precluded San Diego's regulatory scheme. They argued alternatively that the city
could not ban all off-site commercial signs and all non-commercial billboard
advertising, or even if commercial signs could be so regulated, non-commercial
signs could not be prohibited. 453 U.S. at 503-04. Justice White determined that
the plaintiffs had standing to raise the question of the ordinance's validity with
respect to non-commercial advertising because the plaintiff's billboards con-
veyed a large number of non-commercial as well as commercial messages. The
plaintiffs could therefore assert the first amendment rights of their non-
commercial customers under the overbreadth doctrine, which allows a party
whose own activities are unprotected to assert the first amendment rights of
those not before the court when challenging oppressive legislation. Id. at 504.
The plaintiffs had also asserted their own right to circulate information. Brief of
Appellants at 18. See Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (require-
ment that plaintiffs assert their own right to information).
28. 453 U.S. at 504-05. See, e.g., Central Hudson v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (refusing to ignore distinctions be-
tween commercial and noncommercial speech).
29. Commercial speech has been defined generally as "speech in any form
that advertises a product or service for profit or business purposes." J. NOWAK,




had only recently been afforded a measure of constitutional pro-
tectionsO and could still be subject to levels of government regula-
tion precluded in areas of non-commercial communication. 1 He
noted that the Court in recent decisions had maintained this
distinction,, reasoning that to require equal levels of constitu-
tional protection for commercial and non-commercial forms of ex-
pression would be to dilute the present level of protection
guaranteed to non-commercial communication.2
The plurality observed that in Central Hudson v. Public Ser-
vice Commission' the Court had determined that the protection
available for a particular commercial expression depends on the
nature of the expression and the interests served by the regula-
tion. Justice White set forth the four-step test adopted by the
Central Hudson Court to determine the validity of government
restrictions on commercial speech: first, commercial speech that
is misleading or involves an unlawful activity is unprotected; sec-
ond, in order for a restriction on otherwise protected commercial
speech to be valid, it must have been promulgated to further a
substantial government interest; third, the restriction must
directly advance that interest; and fourth, the regulation must be
narrowly drawn to reach no further than necessary to achieve its
goal."
30. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976). In Virginia Pharmacy the Court held that substantial first amendment
protections were to be afforded speech which did no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction. Id. at 762. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942),
the Court had held that commercial advertisements were wholly unprotected by
the first amendment. Id. at 54. Although this holding was severely limited in
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), which held that information concerning
abortions could not be suppressed merely because presented in the form of a
commercial advertisement, remnants of the wholly unprotected commercial
speech doctrine continued to exist until Virginia Pharmacy was decided. 425
U.S. at 760.
31. 453 U.S. at 506-07. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
457, (1978) (regulation of in-person solicitation of clients by an attorney, as a
form of commercial speech, is subject to a lower level of judicial scrutiny); cf.
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (observing the continued
validity of the distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech).
32. 453 U.S. at 506 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
456 (1978)).
33. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Central Hudson struck down, on first amendment
grounds, a public utility commission's regulation that prohibited an electric
utility from advertising to promote the use of electricity. See infra text accom-
panying notes 136-42.
34. 447 U.S. at 563-66.
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Applying these criteria, the plurality observed that there had
been no suggestion that the plaintiffs' advertising had involved
unlawful activities or been misleading. Justice White maintained
that the ordinance's twin goals of improving traffic safety and
the appearance of the city represented substantial government
interests. He found that the city's determination that the distrac-
ting effect of billboards contributed to traffic accidents and that
such signs by their very nature constituted aesthetic harm was
not unreasonable, and that, therefore, their elimination would
directly further the ordinance's objectives.35 The plurality fur-
ther ruled that the ordinance was not overbroad, reasoning that
the most effective method of eliminating the problems caused by
billboards would be to totally eliminate them.36
The plurality next addressed the plaintiffs' assertion that by
allowing some types of signs while prohibiting others, the city
had defeated the purposes of the ordinance. 7 Justice White,
however, reasoned that the prohibition of off-site advertising
was directly related to the objectives of traffic safety and
aesthetics regardless of the fact that other forms of outdoor
advertising continued to exist. He further observed that the city
might reasonably have determined that off-site advertising, with
its frequently changing content, presented greater distractions
to the commutting public. In enacting the ordinance, Justice
White continued, San Diego had made a conscious judgment that
on-site commercial advertising was more valuable to the com-
munity than off-site advertising., Having determined that the
35. 453 U.S. at 509-10. The plurality stated that it was hesitant to disagree
with the judgments of local law makers and quoted Railway Express Agency,
Inc. v. People of New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949):
We would be trespassing on one of the most intensely local and specialized of
all municipal problems if we held that this regulation had no relation to
the traffic problem of New York City. It is the judgment of the local
authorities that it does have such a relation. And nothing has been ad-
vanced to show that to be palpably false.
Id.
36. 453 U.S. at 508.
37. Id. at 510-12. The plaintiffs had argued that if on-site signs were allowed to
remain, they would still distract motorists and pedestrians and continue to be
unsightly burdens on the community. The distinction between on-site and off-
site commercial signs, appellants contended, was unjustifiable because the or-
dinance did not limit the number of billboards, but merely restricted the loca-
tion of the property which they identified. Id.
38. Id. at 512. The plurality accepted this determination, explaining that it
was reasonable for the city to conclude that the commercial public has a
[Vol. 20:637
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constitutional requirements of Central Hudson were met, the
plurality concluded that the ordinance was valid as it applied to
commercial speech.39
Turning to the ordinance's general prohibition of outdoor signs
bearing non-commercial messages,0 Justice White stated that
although it was permissible for the city to legislatively deter-
mine the relative value of various forms of commercial expres-
sion, San Diego's determination that certain commercial
messages possessed greater value than all non-commercial
messages was impermissible.4 Observing that the city had of-
fered no explanation about how non-commercial billboards posed
a greater threat to public safety or the beauty of the city than
did commercial billboards located in the same place, the plurality
concluded that to the extent that the city permitted billboards at
all, it could not limit their content to commercial
advertisements.42
Examing the ordinance's exemption of specific types of non-
commercial signs from the prohibition,43 Justice White maintained
that although the city might permissibly distinguish between
categories of commercial speech when enacting legislation, it
could not judge the relative values of various non-commercial
stronger interest in identifying its place of business and advertising the goods
and services available there than it has in using its property to advertise places
or activities located elsewhere. San Diego, Justice White reasoned, had decided
that the commercial interests represented by on-site advertising outweighed
the city's interest in traffic safety and aesthetics, but that the value of off-site
commercial advertising did not. Id.
39. Id.
40. In addressing this aspect of the ordinance, Justice White noted that
the validity of a total ban against outdoor advertising was not under considera-
tion, although he explained that such a prohibition would give rise to its own
constitutional problems. Id. at 515 n.20. This issue was not before the Court, he
explained, because the San Diego ordinance had provided a number of excep-
tions to its general application. Id.
41. 453 U.S. at 513. The plurality reiterated that the Court's recent com-
mercial speech decisions have consistently recognized that non-commercial
speech merits a greater degree of constitutional protection than commercial
speech. The San Diego ordinance was viewed as effectively inverting this pro-
tection by permitting on-site commercial advertising while prohibiting the use
of billboards for the expression of the great majority of non-commercial
messages regardless of where the signs were located. Id.
42. Id. In Lotze v. Washington, 444 U.S. 921 (1979), the Supreme Court had
summarily affirmed a Washington decision sustaining the validity of a statute
similar to the San Diego ordinance. Insofar as Lotze was inconsistent with the
present ruling in Metromedia, Lotze was overruled. 453 U.S. at 513 n.18.
43. See supra note 3.
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messages. He stated that because San Diego had permitted bill-
boards carrying some non-commercial content, it must permit
other non-commercial messages to be expressed by this medium
as well." Observing that San Diego had distinguished between
permissible and impermissible signs based upon the messages
which they conveyed, the plurality also rejected the city's con-
tention that the ordinance was a reasonable time, place, and
manner restriction. 5
Responding to Chief Justice Burger's dissent, Justice White
noted that both the plurality and the Chief Justice agreed that
the proper judicial role in determining the constitutional validity
of an official restriction upon a particular medium of expression
was to weigh the interests represented by the regulation against
those protected by the first amendment." Justice White believed,
however, that Chief Justice Burger had given insufficient weight
to the first amendment considerations.47 He observed that the
Chief Justice would have determined the validity of the San
Diego ordinance by asking whether it represented reasonable
legislative action, left other adequate means of communication
available, and was essentially neutral to the messages conveyed
by billboards.
Justice White postulated that by "essentially neutral" the
Chief Justice might mean that as long as government does not
44. 453 U.S. at 515.
45. Id. 515-17. The plurality applied the test for determining the propriety
of a time, place, and manner restriction enunciated in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v.
Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), requiring that: (1) the regula-
tion be justified without reference to the content of regulated speech, (2) that it
serve a significant government interest, and (3) that it leave.open sufficient
alternative means of communication. Id. at 771. Although the plurality found
that the goals of the San Diego ordinance were significant, see supra note 35
and accompanying text, the ordinance failed to meet the other two criteria. 453
U.S. at 516-17. The parties had stipulated that other forms of advertising were
to some people prohibitively expensive and insufficient to serve their ex-
pressive needs. Id. San Diego argued that by the stipulation the city had not
agreed that no adequate alternative means of communication existed, pointing
as an example to the forms of signs allowed by the exceptions to the ordinance.
"The stipulation" said the city, "was simply intended to mean that in some in-
stances some problems may exist with alternatives." Brief of appellees at 6-7.
But see Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) (alternative
methods of expression which are more costly and less effective in reaching
those to whom the message is directed are unsatisfactory).
46. 453 U.S. at 517. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
47. 453 U.S. at 517.
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favor one side of a controversy over another, restrictions on pro-
tected speech are permissible. 8 The plurality stated that this
proposition had been rejected in Consolidated Edison v. Public
Service Commission,49 which held that first amendment limita-
tions apply not only to prohibitions of a particular viewpoint, but
to regulations eliminating public discourse on entire topics as
well. 0 Justice White explained that if by "essentially neutral"
the Chief Justice meant that government regulation must not
favor certain communicative viewpoints or entire topics over
others, then the plurality agreed and considered the San Diego
ordinance invalid in this respect.51
Justice White emphasized that courts may not defer to ra-
tional legislative judgment when first amendment rights are at
stake, but must carefully evaluate the importance of conflicting
government and expressive interests.52 Though noting that in his
dissent the Chief Justice had considered the exceptions to the
San Diego ordinance to be negligable and without impact on pro-
tected speech, the plurality viewed the exceptions as an indica-
tion of the strength of the city's interest in prohibiting bill-
boards. Because San Diego had permitted some messages to be
conveyed through the use of billboards, the plurality concluded
that the city had recognized that some communicative interests
were more important than the city's interest in traffic safety and
aesthetics." Justice White maintained that San Diego may not
48. Id. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
49. 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (invalidating an order of the New York Public Ser-
vice Commission that prohibited public utility companies from including with
monthly utility bills, inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy).
50. Id. at 537.
51. 453 U.S. at 519. Justice White cautioned that taken to its fullest ex-
tent, Chief Justice Burger's approach would require reversal of the Court's
decisions striking down anti-solicitation statutes on first amendment grounds.
See infra note 97.
52. 453 U.S. at 519-20 (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public conven-
ience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities but
be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital
to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the
delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances
and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of
the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.
Id.
53. 453 U.S. at 520.
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decide that its official interests are weaker than individual in-
terests in commercial speech, but outweigh private interests in
non-commercial speech. He therefore found the San Diego enact-
ment unconstitutional on its face as exceeding first amendment
limitations protecting freedom of expression," and reversed and
remanded the judgment of the California Supreme Court.5
Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, agreed with the
plurality that the billboard as a method of communication is
within the scope of first amendment protections. Because
Justice Brennan viewed the practical effect of the ordinance as
preventing advertisers from communicating messages of general
applicability through billboards,57  he disagreed with the
plurality's conclusion that the San Diego ordinance did not pres-
ent the question of the constitutionality of a total prohibition of
an expressive medium. 8 Justice Brennan therefore would not
have concentrated on the exceptions to the ordinance in deter-
mining its validity, but instead would have utilized the criteria
for analyzing content-neutral prohibitions of particular methods
of expression. Those criteria had been developed in a line of
cases culminating in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,59 in
54. Id. at 521. The plurality did not reach the plaintiffs' assertion that the
elimination of the plaintiffs' business which would result from enforcement of
the ordinance violated due process, explaining:
[T]he Due Process Clause does not afford a greater degree of protection
to appellants' business than does the First Amendment. Since we hold
that First Amendment interests in commercial speech are not sufficient to
prevent the city from prohibiting off-site commercial advertisements, no
different result should be reached under the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 521 n.25.
55. Id. at 521. The case was remanded to allow the California Supreme
Court to construe a severability clause contained in the San Diego ordinance.
Id. at 521 n.26.
56. Id. at 524 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Blackman joined in Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion.
57. Id. at 525-26. (Brennan, J., concurring). Those people who did not own
or lease property within the city could not make use of the exception for on-site
signs. Moreover, Justice Brennan did not view the other narrowly drawn ex-
emptions as providing billboard users with practical alternatives. Id. at 526.
Also, the ordinance might well have proven to be economically fatal to all
billboard usage within the city. The parties had also stipulated that enforce-
ment of the San Diego ordinance would have brought an end to the billboard in-
dustry in San Diego. See supra note 9.
58. 453 U.S. at 522. (Brennan, J., concurring). See supra note 40.
59. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
648 [Vol. 20:637
1982] Recent Decisions 649
which the Court invalidated a total ban on live commercial enter-
tainment after assessing the weight of the government interests
involved and determining that a more narrowly drawn restric-
tion would have adequately promoted those interests.10
Although he recognized that each method of communication
presents its own problems, Justice Brennan did not think that
they were so dissimilar as to prevent consistent application of
this method of constitutional analysis. Therefore, a total ban on
outdoor signs should be permitted, he maintained, only when a
sufficiently substantial government interest would be directly
served and a less intrusive method of regulation did not exist. 1
Under this test Justice Brennan would not have sustained the
San Diego ordinance because the city had not shown that
billboards were traffic hazards within the city62 or that its in-
terest in aesthetics was genuine and substantial.'
60. 452 U.S. at 70. See also Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)
(outright prohibition of door-to-door sales invalidated); Jamison v. Texas, 318
U.S. 413 (1943) (striking down ordinance banning handbill distributions);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating total ban on handbill leaflet-
ting); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (ordinance absolutely prohibiting
distribution of pamphlets declared void).
61. 453 U.S. at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring). Because such a ban would
have entailed grave limitations upon constitutionally protected speech, Justice
Brennan would have placed the burden upon local government to show that its
ordinance was within these constitutional standards. Id. at 531-32 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
62. Id. at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan refused to accept
the plurality's proposition that reviewing courts had determined that billboards
are a substantial hazzard to traffic safety. In his opinion, the plurality had
merely adopted the minimal scrutiny rational relationship test along with a
presumption of legislative validity to hold that it is not unreasonable for local
legislatures to reach such a conclusion. In contrast, Justice Brennan advocated
requiring the city to offer evidence establishing a correllation between traffic
mishaps and the presence of billboards. Another teason for not-merely accep-
ting legislative judgment in this situation, he suggested, was the possibility
that a local government would disguise the true motives behind its regulations.
Id. at 528 n.7 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan also considered the or-
dinance to be broader than necessary to achieve its traffic safety goals because
it prohibited billboards that were not even visible from the street. Id. at 528-29.
(Brennan, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 530-34 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan found no indica-
tion of a comprehensive effort to improve San Diego's appearance. Moreover, it
was not readily apparent to him that the complete elimination of billboards
would have had a perceptible aesthetic impact on all areas within the city.
Some industrial zones were already so otherwise blighted, he reasoned, that the
removal of billboards from them would have resulted in only negligible im-
provement. Id.
Duquesne Law Review
Justice Brennan also disagreed with the plurality's application
of the commercial-non-commercial speech distinction, finding it
unsupported by the facts and a departure from the Court's
precedents." He believed that the plurality had incorrectly inter-
preted the San Diego ordinance as permitting only on-site com-
mercial messages to be conveyed by billboards while prohibiting
such on-site expression of non-commercial content. In his opinion,
non-commercial signs relating to the property upon which they
were located were excluded from the operation of the ordinance
as were similar commercially oriented billboards."
Justice Brennan also did not accept the plurality's view that a
total prohibition of billboards which exempted non-commercial
communication would pass constitutional muster, because he
believed that this would vest local government officials with
discretionary power to predetermine whether the message con-
veyed by a particular billboard was commercial or non-
commercial." Justice Brennan stated that although it is possible
to speak of the commercial -non-commercial speech distinction in
the abstract, it is quite difficult to apply it in particular situa-
tions.67 Commercial advertisers, he predicted, would attempt to
circumvent this type of regulation by disguising their commer-
cial messages as having non-commercial content. In his opinion,
this would increase the danger that local government officials,
who were already inclined to ban billboards, would interpret
genuine non-commercial speech as commercial expression and
create an even greater potential for government intrusion upon
legitimately protected speech."
In his dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with the plurality that
64. Id. at 534 (Brennan, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 535-36 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan maintained that
a non-commercial enterprise such as a political campaign headquarters could
have identified itself or its activity just as a supermarket or barbershop could
Id.
66. Id. at 536 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan recognized that
the Court had often been bothered by the possibility that local governments'
discretionary controls would curtail first amendment rights. Id. at 537-38 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546 (1975) (performance in city-owned auditorium); Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (parading and picketing); Staub v. City of Bax-
ley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) (solicitation); Kuntz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951)
(public meetings).
67. 453 U.S. at 538-40 (Brennan, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 540 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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the constitutionality of the San Diego ordinance, insofar as it
regulated commercial speech, was not undercut by the distinc-
tion drawn between on-site and off-site commercial signs.69 He
did not agree, however, with the plurality's ultimate determina-
tion that the ordinance unconstitutionally discriminated between
the commercial and non-commercial use of billboards and that it
was invalid because the city, by creating certain non-commercial
exceptions to the general ban, had attempted to choose the ap-
propriate subjects for public discussion. In his view, the problem
which should have been addressed by the Court was whether the
city could completely eliminate off-site outdoor advertising as a
medium of expression.7'
Justice Stevens recognized that the ordinance would reduce
the quantity of communication in San Diego and deprive some
billboard advertisers of an effective means of conveying their
messages to the public. He therefore would not have sustained
the ordinance as a reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tion. 2 However, he maintained that the idea that the first
amendment precludes any regulation which has a limiting effect
on a communicative market, was foreclosed by the Court's deci-
sion in Kovacs v. Cooper,73 which upheld a total prohibition of
sound trucks.
Because he considered San Diego's regulatory interests. suffi-
cient to justify a city-wide prohibition of billboards, Justice
Stevens would have employed a two-step analysis to determine
the ordinance's validity: first examining whether the regulation
was biased in favor of one point of view over another, or
whether it regulated the topics that may be presented for public
69. Id. at 540-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens joined in parts I
through IV of the plurality opinion, dealing with commercial advertising.
70. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
71. 453 U.S. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believed that
the plurality's misconception of the issue presented by the San Diego ordinance
had led them to focus on the exceptions to the regulation rather than on the
general prohibition itself, resulting in a conclusion that the ordinance was un-
constitutional because it did "not abridge enough speech." Id. at 540.
72. Id. at 548-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. 336 U.S. 77 (1949). See infra note 98 and accompanying text. Justice
Stevens hypothesized that if no regulation could have a limiting affect on the
quantity of communication, then municipalities would be precluded from fur-
thering legitimate government goals by prohibiting persons from defacing prop-




debate, and then asking whether ample alternative methods of
communication, unthreatened by gradually increasing restraints,
were left open to all ideas. Justice Stevens found no bias or cen-
sorship in the regulation and concluded that the overall com-
munications market in San Diego remained adequate.
Justice Stevens explained that because he would uphold an im-
partial total ban on billboards, he did not think that the excep-
tions to the ordinance presented any additional threat to pro-
tected speech. Stating that the essential concern of the first
amendment is to preclude the government from imposing its
viewpoint on the public and from selecting the topics for public
debate, he concluded that the few exceptions to the ordinance,
which he characterized as neutral, did not present these
dangers. 5 Justice Stevens therefore would have upheld the San
Diego regulation. 6
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, stated that the result reached
by the plurality would seriously limit the ability of local govern-
ments to effectively address the problems presented by
billboards. He interpreted the plurality opinion as invalidating
the San Diego ordinance because, in the exercise of rational
legislative judgment, the city had excepted from its billboard
prohibition a small number of signs that served special needs.7
The Chief Justice maintained that the plurality had exhibited in-
sensitivity to those who must endure the problems caused by
large, permanent outdoor signs and to the difficulties in effec-
74. 453 U.S. at 552-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 553-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf. Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), invalidating a regulation limiting
dissemination of information concerning controversial issues of public policy.
None of the types of signs exempted by the San Diego ordinance, with the ex-
ception of temporary political campaign posters, related to controversial subject
matter. 453 U.S. at 554-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 3. Justice
Stevens did not find the special treatment accorded temporary political signs
constitutionally objectionable because no political messages were favored over
others. In his view, the city could, consistent with the first amendment, place a
special value on allowing additional communication during political campaigns.
Justice Stevens also noted that the city might reasonably have concluded that
the other signs excepted from the ordinance's prohibition posed a lesser threat
to the appearance of the city than did typical billboards. Furthermore, Justice
Stevens reasoned, the ordinance allowed for greater communicative freedom
than would a total ban. 453 U.S. at 553-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Id. Justice Stevens explained that he also dissented for the reasons
elaborated by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent. Id. at 555 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
77. Id. at 555 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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tively regulating such signs, and had left local lawmakers with
an unsatisfactory choice between either permitting all non-
commercial billboards regardless of the problems they present,
or completely banning all outdoor signs. He also found indica-
tions in the plurality opinion that the total ban option might be
withdrawn altogether, and viewed the plurality's overall ap-
proach as an unwarranted extension of federal judicial power into
the domain of local legislative authority."8
Chief Justice Burger postulated that the plurality had reached
its conclusions by uncritically applying language found in other
contexts in the Court's prior opinions rather than through
careful inquiry into the competing regulatory and first amend-
ment interests involved." He stated that the factors relevant to
this inquiry include the uniqueness of the medium, the availablility
of adequate alternatives, and the public interest served by the
regulation.' Although some weight should be given to the
speaker's choice of forum, the Chief Justice explained, the first
amendment does not guarantee an absolute right to communicate
at any time, place or in any manner one pleases."1 The Chief
Justice pointed out that on previous occasions, the Court had
refused to invalidate reasonable legislative restrictions on ex-
pressive media where the regulation did not present the poten-
tial for government censorship,82 served significant government
interests, and left ample alternatives available. 3
78. Id. at 556 (Burger, C.J., 'dissenting).
79. Id. (quoting Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring)): "Mechanically apply[ing] the doctrines developed in,
other contexts [should be avoided] .... The unique situation presented by this
ordinance calls, as cases in this area so often do, for a careful inquiry into the
competing concerns of the state and the interests protected by the guarantee of
free expression." Id.
80. 453 U.S. at 557-58 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice stated
that the weight given to each factor may vary depending on the medium ex-
amined, and observed that the legitimacy of any regulation of a medium of ex-
pression depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Id.
(quoting Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975):
"Each medium of expression . . . must be assessed for First Amendment pur-
poses by standards suited to it for each may present its own problems." Id.
81. 453 U.S. at 558 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Heffron v. Interna-
tional Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981)).
82. 453 U.S. at 558 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding ban on soundtrucks where other media were available
and the potential for government censorship was not present.)). Cf. Saia v. New
York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (invalidating regulation requiring permits for sound-
trucks as presenting danger of official censorship).
83. 453 U.S. at 559 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
1982]
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The Chief Justice opined that the Court exceeds its judicial
role when it attempts to replace local legislative judgment with
its own by selecting the means through which a city's policies
must be carried out. When faced with legislation that reasonably
furthers substantial government interests, he stated, the Court's
only duty is to determine whether the regulation is essentially
neutral to the messages conveyed and leaves open alternative
methods of expressing those messages."'
Chief Justice Burger found that a wide range of alternative
media were available to would-be billboard advertisers, including
television, radio, newspapers, and magazines. 5 He emphasized
that the San Diego ordinance did not impermissibly discriminate
among ideas, topics, points-of-view, or categories of messages,
and that the narrow exceptions to the ordinance, when con-
trasted with the general prohibition, did not evidence an im-
proper legislative motive to favor or discriminate against par-
ticular points-of-view.6 The Chief Justice did not think that
because the city had yielded to the importance and unique quality
of certain signs it should be wholly deprived of the ability to fur-
ther its goals by prohibiting other signs. 7
Obrien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (where speech and non-speech elements are combined
in the same activity incidental limitations on first amendment freedoms may be
justified by sufficiently important government interests)). See also Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (requiring that
legislative restrictions on protected speech serve significant government in-
terests and leave sufficient alternative media available).
84. 453 U.S. at 561 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice read the
plurality opinion as holding that San Diego's goals of promoting traffic safety
and improving the appearance of the city were sufficiently substantial and that
the city's conclusion that the elimination of billboards would further these in-
terests was reasonable. He maintained, however, that the plurality ignored the
legitimacy of local government authority in furthering these substantial goals
and in invalidating the San Diego ordinance had substituted its judgment for
that of the city officials. See supra text accompanying note 52.
85. 453 U.S. at 562-63 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
86. Id. 561-66 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The scope of the exceptions was
limited to non-controversial subject matter. See supra note 3. Chief Justice
Burger believed that these selective exclusions were themselves justified by
sufficient regulatory interests. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92 (1972) (ordinance that prohibited picketing of schools but made exception for
labor disputes held violative of equal protection; recognized in dictum that some
selective exclusions or distinctions may be justified).
87. 453 U.S. at 564-65 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The exceptions by their
very nature did not implicate first amendment concerns, concluded the Chief




Chief Justice Burger took strong exception to the plurality's
conclusion that San Diego's affording more protection to commer-
cial than to non-commercial speech was impermissible. While con-
ceding that non-commercial speech receives a greater degree of
constitutional protection than does purely commercial expres-
sion, he did not view this as forbidding legislative bodies from af-
fording differing measures of statutory protection when the
restrictions on both forms of speech are otherwise within con-
stitutional limits.88 Rather, the Chief Justice thought that San
Diego had arguably been more faithful to the Constitution by
making classifications within the commercial speech realm while
treating non-commercial messages equally. In his opinion, while a
city may permissibly distinguish between various commercial
content, it is constrained by the first amendment to either per-
mit all non-commercial speech, or prohibit it altogether."
Justice Rehnquist filed' a short dissenting opinion in which he
expressed substantial agreement with the views of the Chief
Justice and Justice Stevens, adding only that in his view
aesthetic considerations alone would have justified a total ban on
billboards." He stated that the exceptions to the ordinance were
minor and self limiting and posed no serious threat to constitu-
tionally protected speech. Moreover, he maintained that a city
should not be required to justify the methods it has chosen to ac-
complish legitimate regulatory ends. Courts, he reasoned, are no
better suited to determine the effectiveness of measures design-
ed to improve the aesthetic quality of municipalities than are
local legislators and administrators, and the democratic process
is better served by leaving such decisions to them.91
Although Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego presented the
Court with an opportunity to authoritatively deal with first
amendment challenges to the regulation of billboards,92 the
88. Id. at 567 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger analogized the
creation of exceptions to the total ban in recognition of certain communicative
needs to legislative remedies that may selectively be applied. Cf. Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 345 U.S. 483 (1955) (selective exclusions by legislature held con-
sistent with equal protection under minimum rationality test).
89. 453 U.S. at 569 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 570. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist believed that
the issue was governed by Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), which held
that aesthetic justifications are sufficient to justify condemnation of private
property for the purposes of urban redevelopment.
91. 453 U.S. at 70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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plurality declined to address the issue of whether or not this ex-
pressive medium could be officially eliminated in its entirety." It
chose instead to use the case as a vehicle for outlining the
parameters beyond which governments could not selectively
burden free speech. The distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech and the constitutional principles which the
Court has evolved from it were vital to this exposition and ex-
emplary of the direction the Court seems to be taking in analyz-
ing content-based regulation of speech.
Freedom of expression can, be limited in two different ways,
both of which the plurality found to be present in the San Diego
ordinance. 4 Government can regulate the expression of specific
ideas and information, or it can indirectly restrict the flow of in-
formation by limiting the activity through which messages are
conveyed.95 When faced with the latter type of abridgement, the
Court has indicated that it will, on a case-by-case basis, weigh
the interests served by the regulation of a particular medium
against the communicative interests curtailed by it to determine
whether the restriction is justified." Further, once a sufficiently
substantial government interest is found to be advanced by the
restriction, the court will also examine whether the interest
could be served by means that would be less intrusive on first
amendment freedoms.9 7 Not all regulations of a method of expres-
93. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The plurality did not inter-
pret the San Diego ordinance as presenting this problem. But 'see 453 U.S. at
525 (Brennan, J., concurring) (practical effect of the San Diego ordinance is to
eliminate the billboard as an effective medium of communication); id. at 542
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (principal question presented is whether a city may
eliminate the outdoor advertising business as a medium of communication); id.
at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (the aesthetic justification alone is enough to
sustain the total prohibition of billboards).
94. 453 U.S. at 503.
95. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 580 (1978). Government
directly regulates ideas or information by controlling or penalizing its expres-
sion either because of the specific viewpoints represented, or because the
government fears that public awareness of certain information will produce
detrimental results. When government limits speech by regulating the activity
through which it is conveyed, the restriction is not aimed at the speech itself,
but rather is intended to serve some other regulatory goal, such as preserving
the tranquility of residential areas by prohibiting loudspeakers. This sort of
restriction is aimed at the non-communicative impact of speech, but has an
adverse effect on communicative opportunity. Id.
96. Id. at 581.
97. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 70 (1981) (in-
validating a total ban of live entertainment within the borough). In Schneider v.
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sion, however, are invalid under this analysis. Reasonable
legislative actions which are aimed at erradicating sufficiently
substantial harms caused by a medium of expression rather than
at harms caused by the messages conveyed, and which do not un-
duly restrict the dissemination of information, have been found
by the Court to be acceptable. 8
The constitutional test is more stringent when legislatures
seek to regulate the communication of particular messages or
ideas. Generally, government is prohibited from restricting ex-
pression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content, unless it can be shown that the regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest. This approach
was taken in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,99 where
the city of Chicago had enacted an ordinance that prohibited
picketing or demonstrating on a public way within a certain
distance of school buildings. The ordinance specifically excluded
from its operation peaceful picketing of schools involved in a
labor dispute.' 0 Observing the interrelationships between the
equal protection clause and first amendment interests, the Court
State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), the Court was faced with a municipal ordinance that
forbade handbill distribution on public streets. Reasoning that it must "weigh
the circumstances and appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in
support of the regulation of the free enjoyment" of first amendment rights, the
Court found that prevention of litter was insufficient to justify the handbill
regulation. Id. at 161-62. Using the same test, the Court in Martin v. Struthers,
318 U.S. 141 (1943), invalidated a municipal ordinance prohibiting persons from
distributing leaflets door to door." Id. The purpose of the ordinance in
Struthers was to protect the privacy of individuals in their homes from the in-
terference of solicitors for various causes. The Court reasoned that "door to
door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little
people" and held the communicative interests of citizens to be of paramount im-
portance. Id. at 144-47. In both Schneider and Struthers the Court found that
less restrictive alternatives were available to serve the government's
regulatory interests. See 308 U.S. at 162; 318 U.S. at 147-48.
98. L. TRIBE, supra note 95, at 581. In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949),
the Court upheld an ordinance that banned the use of sound trucks that emmit-
ted loud and raucious noises on public streets. The ordinance had been pro-
mulgated to protect the community from distracting noises that posed potential
traffic hazards and annoyed the community in general. Further, the restriction
was designed to prevent individuals from foisting their messages upon unwill-
ing listeners who could not avoid hearing them. The Court found that numerous
other methods of communication were available, and that the goals to be served
by the ordinance were sufficient to justify the regulation's incidental limiting ef-
fect on speech. Id. at 87-89.
99. 408 U.S. 92, 95-99 (1972).
100. Id. at 92-93.
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invalidated the ordinance as an impermissible content-based
regulation.1" The Mosley Court considered all ideas to be of
equal constitutional status, and ruled that under the first amend-
ment and the equal protection clause, once a forum is made
available to some groups of people, government is precluded
from disqualifying other groups from utilizing it based upon
what they intend to say."2
The first amendment's incompatability with content-based
regulation is most strongly exhibited when regulations seek to
restrict public discussion of ideas. In First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti,1°3 the Court held that a Massachusetts statute
that prohibited certain corporations from making expenditures
for the purpose of influencing voters on issues not related to the
corporation's business interests was invalid as an impermissible
restriction on freedom of expression.104 Both the nature of the
statute and the character of the regulated speech were impor-
tant factors in the decision. The prohibition was directed at
speech itself, in an effort to curtail its communicative impact,' °
and the messages that were prohibited involved publicly
debatable issues concerning the affairs of government.10'6 The
Court stressed that this form of discussion has always held a
101. Id. at 95-96. For a discussion of these interrelationships see Kalven,
The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, SUP. CT. REV. 1, 29-30
(1965).
102. 408 U.S. at 96. See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), where the
Court, in what in essence was a combined form of first amendment and equal-
protection analysis, invalidated an ordinance that prohibited the picketing of
residences or dwellings, but exempted picketing of those places during labor
disputes. In striking down the ordinance, the Carey Court made it clear that it
was not holding that residential picketing as a method of expression was
beyond the regulatory power of the city, but rather that the use of content-
based distinctions was an impermissible method of exercising that regulatory
power. Id. at 470. The Court explained that only in severe situations where
regulatory interests were especially compelling, and where no adequate alter-
native regulatory method existed, might narrowly drawn content-based restric-
tions be permissible. Id. at 465.
103. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The Court also found that corporations as well as
individuals are entitled to first amendment protections. Id. at 784.
104. Id. at 795.
105. Id. at 786. The Massachussets statute was enacted in order to sustain
the active role of the individual citizen in the electoral process and prevent his
loosing confidence in government, and to protect the rights of shareholders
whose views might differ from those of corporate management. Id. at 787.
106. Id. at 785.
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preferred position on the scale of first amendment values,0 7 and
may only be suppressed in extreme circumstances. 8 The Court
observed that because the democratic process is best served by
allowing the populace to judge for itself the relative merits of
conflicting arguments, the first amendment precludes govern-
ment from handicapping some points-of-view and favoring
others."°
More recently, in Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Com-
mission,1 ' the Court invalidated an administrative order that
prohibited public utility companies from enclosing inserts
discussing controversial issues of public policy in monthly bills.
Following the line of reasoning espoused in Bellotti, and combin-
ing it with the aversion for content-based regulation articulated
in Mosely, the Court ruled that government could not limit
topics for public discussion regardless of whether or not the
limitation would favor a particular viewpoint.' Because the in-
teraction of thoughts through expression is the type of speech
most coveteously protected by the first amendment, the Court
explained, government attempts to exclude certain issues from
the public agenda must fail, even when content neutral in the
sense that no side of a particular debate is benefitted or sup-
pressed.1 2
Nevertheless, not all content-based regulations have been re-
jected by the Court, and it appears that certain categories of
speech may be subject to this type of regulation in response to
problems unique to a particular type of speech, or to an extent
relative to an expression's communicative value, or both.1 ' In
107. Id. at 786-77.
108. Id. at 786.
109. Id. at 790-91.
110. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
111. Id. at 537. See supra note 99.
112. Id. at 537-38. As the Metromedia plurality pointed out, the term "con-
tent neutral" is subject to differing interpretations. Compare the opinion of
Justice Stevens in Young v. American Mini Theateres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)
(government meets its obligation of neutrality when a regulation equally affects
all points of view), with Justice Stewart's dissent in that case, Id. at 84-85
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
99 (1972); where a regulation singles out particular subjects, it "slips from the
neutrality of time, place and circumstance into a concern about content. This is
never permitted.")
113. See L. TRIBE, supra note 95 at 679. Courts must sometimes look to the
content of expression to determine if the type of speech involved is protected
1982]
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Young v. American Mini Theaters,"' a Detroit zoning ordinance
that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from being located
within 1000 feet of certain other business establishments or
within 500 feet of residential areas was challenged as an im-
proper content-based regulation of expression."' The Court ruled
that although the material involved was protected by the first
amendment, its commercial exposition could be subject to
reasonable zoning requirements where a sufficient regulatory in-
terest would thereby be served."' Further, the Court held that
the fact that the regulation was based on a particular type of
content did not invalidate the ordinance either. The regulation of
the place where sexually explicit films could be shown did not in-
volve any point-of-view that the film was attempting to com-
municate, rather, it applied to, and affected equally, all sexually
oriented content, and therefore did not violate the government's
obligation of neutrality."7
Significantly, a plurality of the Young Court went on to justify
this apparent wrinkle in the law of content-based regulation of
speech by imposing its opinion of the relative value of erotic ex-
pression. According to the plurality, society's interest in protec-
ting this type of speech is of a lesser magnitude than the in-
at all by the first amendment. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323 (1974) (libel); Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words). Consolidated Edison v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 n.5. (1980).
114. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
115. Id. at 52. The classification of "adult" was determined by reference to
the content of the material shown in the theaters: If a theater was used to pre-
sent films related to sexual activities or specific anatomical areas, the zoning
regulation was applicable. Id. at 53.
116. Id. at 62-63. The ordinance was designed to prevent neighborhood
deterioration and increased criminal activity by precluding the concentration of
adult theaters in limited areas within the city. Id. at 71 n.34.
117. Id. Justice Stevens explained that the ordinance did not limit the
availability of adult films, but merely regulated where they may be shown. The
burden on protected speech was therefore minimal and justified by the in-
terests served by the zoning regulation. He further indicated that a total pro-
hibition of adult films might not have been justified. Id. at 71 n.35. Never-
theless, even within the scope of time, place and manner restrictions, American
Mini Theaters is a departure from generally accepted notions concerning
content-based regulations. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (time, place or manner restriction may not be
based on the content or subject matter of speech).
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terest in protecting political discussion. Because "few of us
would march our sons or daughters off to war to preserve the
citizens right to see 'specified sexual activities,' ,,... the content of
such materials may be used as the basis for regulation.' 9
A similar line of reasoning seems to be developing with regard
to content-based regulation of commercial speech. Because com-
mercial speech has only recently been afforded a level of con-
stitutional protection, courts have had great difficulty in precisely
defining the extent of its permissible regulation. Initially, com-
mercial speech was subject to no first amendment protection at
all. 20 The Court began to retract from this broad exclusion in
Bigelow v. Virginia,2 ' where it reversed a conviction under a
Virginia statute that prohibited publications from printing adver-
tisements encouraging abortions, finding that such adver-
tisements not only propose commercial transactions but provide
factual material of potential public interest as well.'" According
to Bigelow, although information is conveyed in a commercial
context, its relationship to the marketplace does not render it
valueless within the spectrum of ideas, and it cannot be assumed
that commercial advertising as such is entitled to no first amend-
ment protection. Whether or not a particular message is labeled
commercial, stated the Court, the first amendment interests in
118. 427 U.S. at 70. But note Justice Stewart's remarks in dissent:
[If the guarantees of the First Amendment were reserved for expression
that more than a few of us would take up arms to defend, then. the right
of free expression would be defined and circumscribed by current popular
opinion. The guarantees of the Bill of Rights were designed to protect
against precisely such majoritarian limitations on individual liberty.
Id. at 86 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 70-71. Cf. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981)
Schad investigated an ordinance that completely banned live entertainment, in-
cluding nude dancing, within the borough of Mt. Ephraim. The Court stated,
however, that a narrowly drawn restriction on live nude dancing might have
been upheld. This indicates that within the area of sexually explicit content, the
Court will continue to allow selective distinctions which would be impermissible
when applied to other subject matter.
120. See Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
121. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The definition of commercial speech had already
been limited to commercial content as opposed to expression through a commer-
cial medium. The fact that one paid to communicate his non-commercial ideas
through, for example, a newspaper advertisement, does not deprive him of first
amendment protections. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964).
122. 421 U.S. at 822.
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its dissemination must be assessed against the public interest
served by its regulation. 3
One year later in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,"' the Court invalidated a
statutory prohibition on advertising by pharmacists, ruling that
speech that does nothing more than propose a commercial trans-
action is entitled to protection under the first amendment. 12 5 As
in Bigelow, the state in Virginia Pharmacy had attempted to
prohibit the dissemination of certain information which it
perceived as having a harmful effect on public listeners.2 Such
paternalistic motivations were held to be insufficient to justify
content-based regulations on either commercial or non-
commercial speech. 1"
Although the Court has refused to allow legislatures to further
their policies by keeping the public ignorant of truthful informa-
tion concerning lawful commercial activities,'28 the commercial-
non-commercial speech distinction has continued to persist. The
Virginia Pharmacy Court recognized "common sense" differences
between the two categories of communication." Commercial
123. Id. at 825-26. The Bigelow Court made it clear, however, that it was
not defining the precise extent to which commercial advertising received con-
stitutional protection. The information being advertised concerned abortion, an
activity which had recently been accorded status as a constitutional right.
Advertisement of commercial activities which were subject to legitimate state
regulation were excluded from the Court's holding. Id. at 825.
124. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
125. Id. at 762. At least one authority viewed this development as vesting
commercial speech with full first amendment protection. See NOWAK, supra
note 29, at 767-80.
126. 425 U.S. at 750. The regulation at issue in Virginia Pharmacy pro-
hibited the dissemination of prescription drug prices and was motivated by an
*official desire to protect the safety and welfare of the public by regulating the
"practice of pharmacy." Id.
127. 425 U.S. at 770. According to the Virginia Pharmacy Court, "people
will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed,
and . . . the best means to that end is to open up channels of communication
rather than to close them." Id.
128. A similar result was reached in Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85 (1977), where the Court invalidated a local ordinance prohibiting the
posting of real estate "for sale" and "sold" signs. The purpose of the regulation
was to curtail the flight of white homeowners from racially integrated
neighborhoods. The Court held that it was beyond the city's power to remedy
the problem by restricting the free flow of truthful and legitimate commercial
information. See also Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 618 (1979) (pro-
hibition of advertising contraceptives).
129. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. The Court indicated that some regulation of com-
mercial speech would continue to be permissible, including reasonable time,
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speech by its very nature was considered to be more objective
and durable than other forms of expression and therefore
capable of surviving more stringent regulation. 130 It was also sug-
gested that non-commercial expression, being related to the ex-
position of ideological thought, possesses more intrinsic value
than its commercial counterpart, whose only function is to make
available information concerning goods and services which might
be of interest to the consuming public.'.
These distinctions were given concrete application in Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Association,'a where the Court upheld certain
disciplinary rules of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility
which precluded face-to-face solicitation of prospective clients by
an attorney." The Ohralik Court refused to grant speech related
to commercial activity, which had traditionally been the proper
subject of state regulation, equal status with non-commercial
speech."M The Court feared that a requirement of equal levels of
protection for the two types of communication would have
resulted in a devitalization of the first amendment with respect
to protections extended to non-commercial expression. Because
of the "subordinate position" of commercial speech on the scale
place, and manner restrictions that were justified without reference to the con-
tent of regulated speech, served significant government interests, and left open
sufficient alternative channels for the communication of information. Adver-
tisements for illegal activities remained wholly unprotected, as were false or
misleading commercial messages. Id. at 770-73.
130. Id. The Court opined that a stricter requirement of truth and accuracy
would not deter the speech of a commercial advertiser, who presumably would
be familiar with the goods or services he was touting, to the same extent that
it would deter a newspaper reporter who may be less able to verify the ac-
curacy of his information. Additionally, because commercial speech is profit
motivated, the Court reasoned that there was little chance that regulation
would have a chilling effect upon it.
131. Id. at 779-80 (Stewart, J., concurring).
132. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
133. One year earlier, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 443 U.S. 350 (1977),
the Court had struck down an Arizona Supreme Court rule against a lawyer us-
ing advertising to publicize his services. In a limited holding, the Court ruled
that the stated reasons for the prohibition, prevention of the erosion of profes-
sionalism and the difficulty of enforcing less restrictive means of preventing the
dissemination of misleading information to the public, did not justify the sup-
pression of truthful advertising of the prices of routine legal services. Never-
theless, the Court expressly reserved the question of the permissible scope of
regulation of in-person solicitation of clients by attorneys, where the possibility
of abuse was more acute. Id. at 366.
134. 436 U.S. at 456.
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of constitutional values, a lower level of judicial scrutiny was ap-
plied."3 5
In Central Hudson v. Public Service Commission,"6 the bounds
of permissible commercial speech regulation were more clearly
defined."' In Central Hudson, the New York Public Service Com-
mission, in an effort to encourage energy conservation, had com-
pletely banned an electric utility from advertising to promote the
use of electricity.'" Again the Court held that the first amend-
ment prohibits unwarranted government regulation of commer-
cial communication that is not misleading and concerns a lawful
activity. For a regulation of such speech to be permissible, the
Court stated, it must directly serve a significant government in-
terest and be drawn no more expansively than necessary to ade-
quately serve that interest.39
Significantly, the Central Hudson Court stated that regula-
tions based on the content of commercial speech are not auto-
matically impermissible.' ° Because commercial speech is granted
135. Id. at 456-57. The regulation at issue in Ohralik was upheld because the
interests served by the regulation, protecting the public from possible fraud,
misrepresentation, and overreaching were substantial, and because the
measures taken by the state were reasonably related to the advancement of
those interests. Id. at 462-66. But see In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), where
disciplinary action taken against a non-profit legal organization for soliciting
clients for civil liberties litigation was reversed because the solicitation was not
done for pecuniary gain, was done through the mail rather than in person, and
because no evidence of fraud or misrepresentation existed.
136. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
137. But see Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 n.9 (1979), which states:
Because of the special character of commercial speech and the relative
novelty of First Amendment protection for such speech, we act with cau-
tion in confronting First Amendment challenges to economic legislation
that serves legitimate regulatory interests. Our decisions dealing with
more traditional First Amendment problems do not extend automatically
to this as yet uncharted area.
Id.
138. 447 U.S. at 559.
139. Id. at 566. Under this intermediate level of scrutiny, the Court in-
validated the New York regulation because it prohibited speech which was not
shown to impair the government interest in energy conservation and in some
cases might even have furthered it. Id. at 570. The regulation at issue would
not only have prohibited advertisements which increased energy consumption
generally, but also would have prohibited advertisement of energy efficient
devices which could have resulted in a net decrease in the public's consumption
of energy. Id.
140. Id. at 564 n.6. The Court also stated, however, that it would "review
with special care regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order
to pursue a non-speech related policy." Id. at 566 n.9.
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a measure of constitutional protection only in recognition of its
informational value,' and because economic self interest is
presumably strong enough to encourage commercial speakers to
seek other methods of disseminating their information or to
challenge prohibitions as unreasonable, content-based regulations
of commercial speech are not per se objectionable on first amend-
ment grounds."2
The plurality in Metromedia viewed the San Diego ordinance
as having a limiting affect on speech both by restricting the
billboard as a method of communication and by controlling the
messages that may be expressed by this medium.' Their treat-
ment of the on-site off-site sign distinction is consistent with re-
cent commercial speech cases involving content-based regula-
tions. It is also consistent with the idea that commercial com-
munication possesses a more limited expressive value and is
therefore subject to more stringent government regulation, a ra-
tionale which seems to have gained a measure of acceptance. A
majority of the Court appears to be willing to continue to give
greater latitude to local governments' regulation of this form of
expression and to defer to legislative judgments about the
relative weight to be given to various commercial messages. 4
As a result, content-based distinctions made within the commer-
cial speech area will probably be permitted in the future where
the goal of the regulation is to protect the community from
secondary effects associated with its method of conveyance. It is
equally probable, however, that content-based regulations aimed
at controlling the direct effects of commercial messages, such as
the type of restriction found in Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy,
will meet stiffer resistance from the Court, for elements of
141. Id. at 563. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783
(1978).
142. In Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 68-69 (1976), the
Court in dictum stated: "The measure of constitutional protection to be afforded
to commercial speech will surely be governed largely by the content of the com-
munication." Further; "'differences between commercial price and product
advertising ... and ideological communication' permits regulation of the former
that the First Amendment would not tolerate with respect to the latter." Id. at
69 n.32 (quoting Virginia State Bd. Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 779 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
143. 453 U.S. at 503.
144. Id. at 451 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens concurred in this
portion of the plurality opinion.
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government censorship are more fully implicated. "'
The plurality's holding that the San Diego ordinance made im-
permissible content-based distinctions for non-commercial speech
is also supported by precedent. The ordinance contained precisely
the type of content-based distinction between non-commercial
messages that had been struck down in Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosely,"' which articulated the general rule that once
government has made a forum available to the public, it cannot
limit its usage based upon what a speaker might wish to say. " 7
Similar reasoning supports the plurality's objection to San
Diego's prohibition of non-commercial content in instances where
commercial messages were allowed to be conveyed through
billboards. However, at this point in the analysis, the plurality's
focus shifted from an analysis of the ordinance's effect on the
message conveyed, to an appraisal of its effect on the method of
conveyance. Employing a balancing process, the plurality reasoned
that by permitting commercial billboard messages in instances
where non-commercial signs were prohibited, San Diego had
demonstrated that its regulatory interests were insufficient to
justify the burdens it had placed upon the more fully protected
speech. "' 9 The plurality's appraisal of the countervailing interests
involved, like its analysis of the ordinance's effect on commercial
speech, was again firmly grounded on the relative values assigned
145. See L. TRIBE, supra note 95, at 679.
[A] content based discrimination is more likely to be upheld if the govern-
ment's real interest is not in protecting citizens from exposure to the
speech as such but rather in such 'secondary effects' as the physical
deterioration and crime which accompany the concentration of 'adult'
'theaters in a 'red light' district.
Id. (referring to the analogous position taken with regard to content-based
regulation of non-obscene sexually explicit material in Young v. American Mini
Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976)).
146. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
147. Id. at 96. See supra note 99.
148. The Court had previously used this approach in invalidating ordinances
prohibiting leafleting. See supra notes 106-113.
149. 453 U.S. at 520. See id. at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Bren-
nan would have upheld the San Diego ordinance only if the city could "show
that a sufficiently substantial governmental interest is directly furthered by the
total ban, arid that any more narrowly drawn restriction, ie., anything less than
a total ban, would promote less well the achievement of that goal." Id. While it
is unclear what the plurality would have required the city to "show" once the
countervailing interests had been identified, both the plurality and those con-
curring would engage in the traditional balancing approach.
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to commercial and non-commercial types of communication. If
San Diego's interests were not stronger than the interests served
by commercial billboard expression, reasoned the plurality, then
it must follow that its interests were not as important as those
served by non-commercial billboard communication either."5
The plurality's primary reliance on what is essentially a valua-
tion approach to first amendment analysis is an extension of
recently developed commercial speech doctrine. While the Court
in other decisions which had observed the commercial, non-
commercial distinction had justified more stringent restrictions
on commercial speech by making reference to its expressive
value, it had also found that unique aspects of commercial com-
munication made the regulations necessary.151 No such deter-
mination was made with regard to the San Diego ordinance.15
Metromedia, then, indicates a willingness of some members of
the Court to provide first amendment protection based solely on
the worth of speech as determined by judicial characterization.
The view that commercial speech, being informational in
nature, is less constitutionally significant than the expressive in-
teraction of ideological thought overlooks important practical
considerations. The freedom to express and to hear messages of
a purely factual nature is no less important than the freedom to
engage in political debate. To be fully effective, the first amend-
ment must protect more than the unfettered ability to take part
in a discussion and express one's point-of-view. In order to
develop intelligent opinions one must have access to relevant in-
150. Id. at 521. In this respect, the San Diego regulation was invalid not
only because it favored one type of speech over another, but because of the
city's implicit admission that its regulatory interests were not substantial
enough to justify the intrusive restrictions it had placed on the billboard as a
medium of communication.
151. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978)
(state has legitimate and compelling interest in regulating those aspects of com-
mercial solicitation which involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation and over-
reaching); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (false, deceptive, or misleading commercial speech
may be effectively regulated); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (help-wanted advertising through use
of discriminatory gender-based newspaper columns is itself illegal and receives
no first amendment protection).
152. 453 U.S. at 511. The plurality, applying a test of minimum rationality,
did explain that the city may have believed that on-site commercial signs were
less hazardous than off-site commercial billboards.
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formation." This is true regardless of the category to which a
particular subject might be assigned, for not only is speech that
is deemed commercial indispensible to the proper allocation of
resources in a free market system, it is also indispensible to forming
competent opinions about how that system should be governed."" It
is a function of the first amendment to insure that the public has
an opportunity to become aware and knowledgeable, for this is
essential to democratic decision-making. 5 ' Judgments about the
particular worth of speech should not be permitted to interfere
with this process.
Thomas A. French
153. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION To SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948) (first amendment is instrumental in guaranteeing the
capacity for self government).
154. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
155. iBut see Bork, Neutral Principals and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 24-28 (1971) (special first amendment treatment is reserved for
political speech only).
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